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Abstract— This paper describes a game theoretical model of
traffic where multiple drivers interact with each other. The
model is developed using hierarchical reasoning, a game theo-
retical model of human behavior, and reinforcement learning.
It is assumed that the drivers can observe only a partial
state of the traffic they are in and therefore although the
environment satisfies the Markov property, it appears as non-
Markovian to the drivers. Hence, each driver implicitly has
to find a policy, i.e. a mapping from observations to actions,
for a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process. In this
paper, a computationally tractable solution to this problem is
provided by employing hierarchical reasoning together with
a suitable reinforcement learning algorithm. Simulation results
are reported, which demonstrate that the resulting driver mod-
els provide reasonable behavior for the given traffic scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
As is apparent from the prior literature (see e.g., [1]
[2] [3]), models of human driver actions in a given traffic
scenario can be exploited for the development of decision
making algorithms for autonomous driving and for the
implementation of high-fidelity simulators that can facili-
tate the validation and testing of competing autonomous
driving policies. A comprehensive list of existing human
driver models, control based and behavioral based, can be
found in [4]. Many of the proposed models lack driver
interaction dynamics, which are important for operating in
traffic and simulating real driving. One example of a model
that incorporates interactions between drivers can be found
in [5], where built in logical rules (if-then-else) are used
to represent the decision making process. Although this
approach successfully incorporates multi-tasking behavior
and interaction of human drivers, it is not clear how the
logical rules are obtained, and furthermore, the dynamic be-
havior (multi step decision making) is not considered. In [6],
several logical algorithms are used to model decision making
during lane changes. The resulting actions of the drivers are
predefined with strict rules, and driver aggressiveness can be
incorporated into the model by tuning certain parameters.
In this paper, we present a method to model the collective
behavior of vehicles in traffic by microscopic modeling
of human drivers. The main advantages of the proposed
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approach are that a) driver actions are not assumed to be
known a priori but determined based on a human decision
making process, b) multiple interactions between drivers,
vehicles and automation (for example driverless cars) can
be modeled simultaneously and, therefore, a traffic scenario
with many vehicles can be analyzed realistically. Using the
proposed method, collective behavior of the overall system
can be quantified. For example, the percentage increase in
accidents based on the traffic density can be determined. To
achieve this, hierarchical reasoning from game theory and
reinforcement learning is employed. Hierarchical reasoning
helps model the interactions between intelligent decision
makers (drivers) while reinforcement learning helps simulate
a time-extended scenario with multiple actions. It is noted
that such an approach has not been used before for road
traffic modeling. At the core of this approach is a method
known as “semi network-form games” [7] which help us
obtain the probable outcomes of a complex traffic scenario
in the presence of multiple driver-driver interactions.
It is noted that there are other game theoretical approaches
to model highway driving such as [8] and [9]. Although these
approaches exploit driver interaction models using a game
theoretical setting, they do not consider dynamic (multi-
move) scenarios. The latter are exploited in [10] for Hybrid
Electric Vehicle (HEV) energy management where the driver
and the powertrain are considered to be two players in
a game. A major advantage of our hierarchical reasoning
approach is that it is easily scalable to multiple players, e.g.,
see [11] where a 50 player game is treated.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The problem
definition is given in Section II. The process of obtaining
driver policies utilizing reinforcement learning and game
theory is explained in Section III. Simulation results are
provided in Section IV and a summary is given in Section V.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The problem we treat in this paper is to predict the
behavior of drivers in a traffic scenario where the cars
are driven on a 3-lane highway. Fig. 1 shows an example
scenario with 6 cars. It is noted that using the method we
propose, scenarios with more cars or more lanes can be
simulated. Below, we provide the information to precisely
define the scenario we want to simulate.
In this scenario, the cars are assumed to be traveling in
the same direction and driven by human drivers who obey
the general traffic laws.
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Fig. 1: Traffic in a 3-lane highway.
A. Action space
Drivers have 5 basic actions:
1) ‘Maintain’ current speed
2) ‘Accelerate’, provided velocity does not exceed 110
km/h
3) ‘Decelerate’, provided velocity is above 50 km/h
4) Move to the lane on the left
5) Move to the lane on the right
Remark: It is noted that the actions mentioned above are
high level decisions. Acceleration, deceleration, and lane
changes are not immediate and occur in response to these
high level decisions as determined by the vehicle level
control and dynamics.
In this paper, acceleration and deceleration occur at rates
of 2.5 m/s2 and −2.5 m/s2, respectively, and lane changes
occur with constant lateral velocity such that the total time
to change lanes is 3s. During lane changes, the longitudinal
velocity remains constant. Cars are able to change actions
while accelerating/decelerating before the target speed is
reached, but once a lane change begins, it always continues
to completion.
B. Observation space
In real traffic flow, a driver can neither observe nor process
all the information about all the cars on the road. A human
can possibly observe and use the information he/she obtains
from the cars in a certain vicinity of him/her. Therefore, we
assign the following observation space for the drivers:
1) The distance from the car in front, quantified as “close”
(distance ≤ 40m), “nominal” (40m< distance ≤ 70m),
or “far away” (distance > 70m).
2) The distance from the car on the front left, quantified
as “close”, “nominal” or “far away.”
3) The distance from the car on the front right, quantified
as “close”, “nominal” or “far away.”
4) The distance from the car on the rear left, quantified as
“close”, “nominal” or “far away.”
5) The distance from the car on the rear right, quantified
as “close”, “nominal” or “far away.”
6) The relative motion of the car in front, quantified as
“approaching” (distance decreasing), “stable” (distance
not changing), or “moving away” (distance increasing).
7) The relative motion of the car in front left, quantified
as “approaching”, “stable” or “moving away.”
8) The relative motion of the car in front right, quantified
as “approaching”, “stable” or “moving away.”
9) The relative motion of the car in rear left, quantified as
“approaching”, “stable” or “moving away”
10) The relative motion of the car in rear right, quantified
as “approaching”, “stable” or “moving away.”
C. Reward function
The “reward function” is a mathematical representation of
the goals of a driver. Basic goals of the drivers in real traffic
are to not have a collision, to maximize their headway, and
to minimize their driving effort.
The reward function R reflecting these goals is defined as
R = w1c + w2h + w3e, (1)
where wi, i = 1, 2, 3 are the weights for each term and c, h
and e represents “collision”, “headway” and “effort.” These
terms are explained below.
c (collision): The term c gets the value of “-10” when a
collision occurs and the value of “0”, otherwise.
h (headway): The term h gets the following values
depending on the headway distance
h =
10 if headway≥70m0 if 40m≤headway<70m−5 if headway<40m (2)
e (effort): The term e gets the value of -10 if the
driver’s action is different than his/her previous action and 0
otherwise.
The weighting terms wi may change depending on the
aggressiveness of the driver but intuitively, collision avoid-
ance must always be the most important factor and keeping
a safe headway distance should typically be more important
than effortless driving. So, although the weights may vary
from driver to driver, the following relationship between the
weights is reasonable:
w1 > w2 > w3 (3)
III. OBTAINING DRIVER POLICIES
A policy is defined as a map from the observation space
to the action space. In this paper, the map and hence the
policies are stochastic: As in the case of real life, the drivers
have a probability distribution over their possible actions. To
obtain this stochastic map, two main tools are utilized: Level-
k approach, a subset of hierarchical reasoning, and Jaakkola
reinforcement algorithm. In this section both of these tools
are explained.
A. Level-k reasoning
The driver models developed in this work are based on
the observation that humans use various levels of reasoning.
The lowest level, level-0, represents an intelligent agent
(driver) who chooses his/her actions without considering the
possible actions of other agents. For example, if a driver
decides to make a lane change, say, from lane A to lane B,
without considering the possible actions of the other drivers
in lane B, that driver is designated as a level-0 thinker.
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However, if the same driver assumes that the other drivers
are level-0 thinkers, and then chooses his/her actions as the
best response to the possible actions of other drivers, then
he/she is designated as a level-1 thinker. So, a level-k driver
assumes that the rest of the drivers are level-(k-1) and acts
accordingly. More detailed information about this approach
can be found in [12] and [13].
1) Level-0 policy: In general, level-0 policies are consid-
ered as “reflexive” behavior, the kind of actions one takes
without really taking into account other players’ possible
actions. These actions can be random, meaning that every
possible action is given the same probability of realization
given a state, or it can be a very simple behavior that is
formed using very basic principles of the scenario one is




slow down, if front car is approaching
accelerate to/drive at nominal speed, otherwise
(4)
B. Jaakkola reinforcement learning
Jaakkola reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm (see [14])
is similar to other conventional RL methods (see [15]) in
terms of having a policy evaluation step, where state-action
pairs of a policy are assigned values based on the rewards
gained, and a policy improvement step where the existing
policy is refined so that higher valued actions for the states
have increased probability of actually being played. The main
distinguishing feature of Jaakkola RL algorithm is that al-
though conventional approaches rely on the Markov property
of the system for convergence guarantees, the Jaakkola RL
method is developed for cases where although the underlying
dynamics are Markov, the agents can not observe all of the
system states and therefore the system does not appear to
be Markov to the agent. This defines a Partially Observable
Markov Decision Process (POMDP) and Jaakkola RL is
guaranteed to converge to at least a local maximum in terms
of average rewards. It is noted that the highway problem
defined in this paper is a POMDP, where although the overall
system is Markov, it appears non-Markovian to the drivers
due to their restricted observation spaces (see Section II-B).
C. Putting everything together
To obtain a level-k driver policy, we assign level-(k-1)
policies to all the drivers in the scenario except the driver we
want to “train” to a level-k policy. By training we mean that
we run the Jaakkola RL algorithm where the trained driver
is the learner and the rest of the drivers, together with the
vehicles, constitute the environment.
To start the procedure, we first assign a level-0 policy to
all of the drivers except the one we want to train, then train
a level-1 policy and save it. We then train a level-2 policy by
assigning all of the other drivers the level-1 policy we just
saved and then save the newly obtained level-2 policy. This
can continue until we reach the depth of reasoning (level-k)
we want to achieve. It is shown in some experimental studies
(see [13]) that the probability of finding a level-3 human
Fig. 2: Simulation Environment
player is low. Humans are generally level-1, less frequently
level-2 and even less frequently level-0, according to the
study. Therefore, we train driver policies up to level-2 in
this paper.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Environment and Set-up
For the purposes of these simulations, the width of a lane
is 3.6 meters, and all cars are 2m x 6m. Cars always drive
at the center of a lane unless they are changing lanes. The
longitudinal axis is called x, and its origin is colocated with
the car that is to be trained or evaluated. Cars more than
400m away are considered to be out of visual range and
unobservable. If no car can be observed in a position, this
is considered equivalent to a car that is “far” and “moving
away.”
Figure 2 shows a snapshot of an example simulation with
three lanes. The rectangles represent cars, which are all
moving to the right, and the arrows show the velocities of
the cars relative to the car under evaluation, which is located
in the center lane at x = 0. The observation is as follows:
• Front left: close, moving away.
• Front center: far, moving away.
• Front right: far, approaching.
• Rear left: nominal, approaching.
• Rear right: nominal, stable.
Notice that two cars are unobservable in this scenario. The
car in the front center position is beyond visual range, so its
observed status is “moving away” even though it is actually
“stable”. Also, the car in the rear right “far” position is
hidden by the car in the rear right “nominal” position. This
reflects the POMDP nature of the problem, as discussed
previously.
Initialization of a simulation requires the specification of
the following values:
1) n`: the number of lanes;
2) nc: the number of cars;
3) x0max: the maximum allowable initialization distance;
4) tf : the simulation duration.
When a car is initialized, it is assigned to a lane randomly
with uniform distribution, and then it is placed within that
lane randomly with uniform distribution in [−x0max, x0max]
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such that the distance between all previously initialized cars
is at least 20m. The car is also assigned a policy to follow
(level 0, 1, or 2). This process repeats until all cars have
been initialized, and then the simulation proceeds according
to Algorithm 1.
1 t=0;
2 while t < tf do
3 foreach car do
4 Get observation from environment.
5 Select action according to policy and
observation.
6 Update position and relative velocity according
to action.
7 end
8 if training a policy then
9 Evaluate reward function for trainee.
10 Update value function.
11 end
12 if trainee/evaluatee is in a collision state then
13 End the simulation.
14 end
15 t = t + ∆t
16 end
Algorithm 1: Single Episode Simulation
B. Initialization of Training
When training a new policy, the observation value func-
tion, V , for observed message m, and the action value
function, Q, for message/action pair (m, a), are initialized
as follows:
∀m, V (m) = 0;
∀m,∀a, Q(m, a) = 0.
(5)
For each observation, the actions are assigned equal prob-




Q(m, a) > V (m), (6)
then 0.01 is added to the probability of selecting
argmaxa Q(m, a), after which the action probabilities are
normalized.
The observation space described in Section II-B has 310
unique observations. In order to ensure that the learning algo-
rithm is exposed to a large portion of the observation space,
the trainee needs to be exposed to both sparsely and densely
populated roads. Therefore, during training, the number of
cars is selected randomly, with uniform distribution, where
0 ≤ nc ≤ nmaxc . The maximum number of cars, nmaxc , is
chosen based on the number of lanes and x0max such that if
nmaxc cars are placed in the environment, the road will be
near capacity.
Training then proceeds according to Algorithm 2.
As training progresses, the functions V (m) and Q(m, a)
converge, and as the policy is improved, the average reward
received increases. For example, consider a training scenario
with w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, and w3 = 0.1.
1 step=0;
2 while step < desired training cycles do
3 Randomly select nc ∈ [0, nmaxc ].
4 Initialize all cars with level k − 1 policies.
5 Evaluate the level k policy using Algorithm 1.
6 Improve the policy.
7 step=step+1.
8 end
Algorithm 2: Training Process
Figure 3 shows V (m) and Q(m, a) for the observation that
all five vehicles are “far” and “moving away”. Six values
are plotted, including V (m) and Q(m, a) for each of the
five actions associated with m. All values converge as the
training progresses, and the values of actions “maintain”,
“move left”, and “move right” converge to approximately
the same value, which is higher than the value of actions
“accelerate” and “decelerate”. This is reasonable because w3
is small, so taking an action other than “maintain” has only
a minimal effect on the reward. However, by accelerating
or decelerating, the car might move toward other cars that
were previously unobservable, which could lead to decreased
rewards due to less headway or possible collisions.
Figure 4 shows the average reward as training progresses.
Note that in this scenario with w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, and w3 =
0.1, the maximum reward is w1(0) + w2(10) + w3(0) = 3.
Thus, the average reward should converge to a value near 3
if the policy leads to few collisions, maximum headway, and
minimal effort. The average reward can also be expected to
be slightly below 3 due to the occasional requirement to take
an action at a cost of w3(−10) = −1 in order to avoid a
collision with a cost of w1(−10) = −6.
An example simulation can be seen in Figure 5, which
shows a level-2 driver, represented by© driving on a 3 lane
road with level-1 drivers, represented by . The direction of
travel is to the right, and the vertical dotted lines represent
the boundaries between the “close”, “nominal”, and “far”
regions for the level-2 driver. Note that for clarity, this figure
limits the amount of road shown, and there are additional cars
farther ahead of the level-2 driver, as well as behind it.
Figure 5a shows the initial configuration, where a car is
located in the “nominal” region ahead of the level-2 driver,
causing reduced rewards. The level-2 driver therefore moves
to the right lane, as shown in Figure 5b. The level-1 car in
the upper left corner of the figure can also be seen changing
lanes to improve its reward.
During the simulation, a car approaches from the front
from outside the figure, which causes the car in the upper
right corner of Figure 5b to decelerate. The two cars in front
of the level-2 driver begin to interact and change lanes. This
also causes the level-2 driver to change lanes in order to
maintain headway. Figure 5c shows a later moment where
the two front cars have moved into the “close” region and one
of them is entering the level-2 driver’s lane. This causes the
level-2 driver to decelerate, which can be seen by comparing
the relative vehicle positions in Figures 5c and 5d.
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Fig. 3: Values of message and associated message/action
pairs
Fig. 4: Average Reward vs. Training Steps
C. Comparison of Driver Profiles
Different driver profiles can be compared by simulating
multiple episodes and tracking metrics such as the number
of collisions or the number of lane changes, among others.
For example, consider two level-1 policies that were trained
using the following weights:
Profile 1: w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.1
Profile 2: w1 = 0.4, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.3
These profiles value headway equally, but Profile 1 gives
a stricter penalty for collisions, while Profile 2 gives a
relatively large penalty for changing actions at the cost
of a more leniant penalty for collisions. Note that these
two profiles are selected to illustrate the sensitivity of the
resulting policies to the weights used for training. They are
not necessarily optimal driver profiles or representative of
most drivers. One area for future work is the characterization
of actual driver profiles, and the primary use of these profiles
is to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed methods for
(a) t = 0
(b) t = 8
(c) t = 70
(d) t = 90
Fig. 5: Example Simulation
analyzing and comparing different driver behaviors.
Figure 6 presents the results from a series of simulations,
where each curve shows the average over 1000 trials for
each nc ∈ [1, 60], which is the abscissa in the figures. The
simulations have 3 lanes, and the duration is set to tf =
200sec with x0max = 600m and the maximum visual range
set to 400m.
Figure 6a shows the fraction of simulations that end in
collision for both of the driver profiles. As expected, as the
traffic density increases, so does the collision rate. Also,
Profile 1 has a lower collision rate than Profile 2 due to
the higher penalty placed on collisions during training.
The collision rates in Figure 6a are higher than the rates
typically observed in traffic. This could be due to insufficient
control authority (e.g., an additional action could be added to
decelerate at a faster rate). It could also be due to insufficient
exploration of the observation space during policy training.
Alternatively, the high rates could be due to the limited
information available in the observations, which leads to a
reduced ability to take necessary deconflicting actions. How-
ever, as previously discussed, the proposed method provides
high level commands, and it can be paired with lower level




Fig. 6: Driver Profile Comparison.
its advantages for large scale scenarios. Finally, note that
these collision rates do not account for relative velocity, and
therefore they include contact with zero relative velocity.
These types of collisions can be addressed by simply adding
a small safety region around each vehicle to avoid physical
contact. These ideas will be explored in future work.
Figure 6b shows the number of lane changes per action
selection for the two driver profiles. After an initial transient,
the number of lane changes for Profile 2 decreases as the
rate of collisions increases due to the fact that w1 and w3
have similar weights. Profile 1, on the other hand, prefers to
change lanes more often if it reduces the collision rate, which
is consistent with the expected behavior when collisions are
associated with a much larger penalty than changes to the
current action.
V. SUMMARY
In this paper, we presented a game theoretical approach
to represent and model interacting driver behavior in traffic.
We utilized hierarchical reasoning to model the interac-
tion between drivers and reinforcement learning to obtain
driver policies for time-extended (multi-move) scenarios.
We demonstrated, via simulations of a 60-car scenario, that
the proposed method provides reasonable driver behavior
under the given traffic conditions. In addition, we provided
statistical analysis where the effects of driver aggressiveness
on the number of collisions and on number of lane changes
were investigated. It is noted that the proposed approach is
easily scalable in terms of both the number of drivers and the
number of actions (in time). This makes the proposed method
more suitable for real life traffic modeling as well as imple-
mentation in high-fidelity simulators to evaluate competing
autonomous driving algorithms. In addition, the proposed
game theoretic approach results in control policies that can
be incorporated into the autonomous driving algorithms.
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